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ABSTRACT
Often it is believed that terrorist organizations are solely based in Africa, the 
Middle East and Asia, but what if there were groups using terrorist tactics right in our 
backyard?  The Western Hemisphere has seen its share of terrorist organizations since the 
early 1960s.  In recent years there has been a rise of insurgencies in Latin America, and 
these groups have been directly linked to terrorist organizations in the Middle East.  
Counterterrorism is one of America’s front line policies in order to create a safer global 
environment.  The U.S. government uses several different strategies to combat terrorism, 
such as, military force and foreign aid.  Critics often debate whether foreign aid is 
effective or whether it is just creating more unstable governments and increased U.S. 
dependency. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance as a 
counterterrorism strategy.  It looks at the role that United States foreign assistance has 
played in India’s counterterrorism strategy, and how the application of a similar strategy 
in Latin America has proven to be successful to combat the rise of terrorism in the region. 
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Until the attacks on September 11th, 2001, most Americans aside from those 
involved in the government or academia had never heard of the term counterterrorism.  
Today, this is a term that resonates all over the news, popular television shows, and other 
media outlets; it is nearly impossible to have never heard the term counterterrorism, but 
do we really know what it means?  According to Jason Rineheart, a Freelance Writer 
specializing in counterterrorism and Middle East security and Research Assistant at the 
Terrorism Research Initiative, counterterrorism is a term that is very difficult to define 
and an all-inclusive doctrine.1  In the U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual’s 
glossary it is defined as, “Operations that include the offensive measures taken to 
prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”2  This definition is the same for 
counterterrorism policy and counterterrorism operations.
Historically, terrorist groups have usually established themselves in countries with 
weak or failed regimes, and therefore, U.S. foreign aid has become a counterterrorism 
policy instrument.  Counterterrorism is one of the United State’s front line policies in 
order to create a safe global environment, and foreign aid is one type of U.S. 
counterterrorism strategies.  This is when the United States supports counterterrorist 
capabilities in countries that otherwise would not have the means to combat insurgent 
groups without assistance.3  Therefore, it is important to know whether foreign aid is 
1 Jason Rineheart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 5 (2010), 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122/html.
2 United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Marine 
Corps Warfighting Publication, 2006), Glossary-4.
3 Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler, and Javed Younas, "Foreign Aid as Counterterrorism Policy," 
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effective.  Countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq have received millions of 
United States dollars in foreign aid towards securing U.S. interests in the Middle East and 
South Asia. 
Foreign assistance can take the shape of several different types of relief: bilateral 
development aid, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and security goals, 
humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid.4  The largest 
category of U.S. foreign assistance is bilateral development assistance, which is mostly 
managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), because of the 
global aid initiatives Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Global AIDS Initiative.  
The Department of the Treasury manages most of the multilateral aid, and the 
Department of Defense and the State Department manage most of the military and 
security-related programs.5  In 2002 President George W. Bush released his National 
Security Strategy, and for the first time, it established global development as a pillar of 
U.S. national security just behind defense and diplomacy.
Chapter one of this thesis looks into the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance as 
a counterterrorism strategy, and uses examples of several different types of assistance to 
show their success.  Supporters of foreign aid as a counterterrorism strategy argue that 
the assistance that the United States gives to these countries has helped the U.S. fight the 
global war on terror.  Some policymakers and academics believe that through United 
States foreign aid, receiving countries help promote stability in their region.  Others, like 
Published Articles & Papers, paper 153 (2010), http://research.create.usc.edu/published_papers/153.
4 Larry Nowels and Curt Tarnoff, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, 




economist William Easterly, argue that foreign aid is ineffective and in reality creates 
more instability than good.  Easterly wrote a book in 2007, The White Man’s Burden: 
Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, where 
he criticizes existing aid strategies for their lack of accountability.  Similarly, critics often 
argue that the United States invests too much in foreign assistance.  Critics debate on 
whether foreign aid is effective or whether it is just creating more unstable governments 
and increased U.S. dependency. 
With the United States’ pivot to Asia, U.S. – India relations have been crucial.  
India is the world’s largest democracy and its national security is key to U.S. interests in 
the region.  Chapter two takes a look at India’s counterterrorism strategy in clashes 
affecting the Jammu and Kashmir region, Andhra Pradesh, and the northeastern states of 
Asham and Nagaland.  The role of the United States in India’s counterterrorism strategy, 
and the impact of U.S. foreign assistance in the country have been key to its development 
and stability in an otherwise hostile region.  India has been the target of several terrorist 
attacks from both internal and external terrorist groups since its partition in 1947.6  
Following the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, the need for U.S. – India cooperation to 
counter terrorist threats in the region became more prevalent.  Intelligence sharing 
between the two countries has shown to be effective, but continued U.S. assistance 
through training and capacity building are key to the country’s stability.   
Given South America’s close proximity to the U.S. homeland, the rise of 
terrorism in Latin America should be cause for alarm.  Chapter three looks at the 
similarities between India and Latin America, presents the success of U.S. assistance in 
6 Eben Kaplan and Jayshree Bajoria, “Counterterrorism in India,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 
28, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/india/counterterrorism-india/p11170. 
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Colombia’s counterterrorism strategy, and argues that similar U.S. assistance strategies to 
the two countries must continue.  The role of U.S. foreign assistance in India compares to 
that of its role in some countries of Latin America and their counterterrorism strategy.  
United States foreign assistance to Colombia to combat the violent terrorist group, 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People’s Army (FARC), played a major role 
in the Colombian government’s success.  Despite the absence of operational terrorist cells 
in Latin America, the influence of Iran, links to Hezbollah, and both Cuba’s and 
Venezuela’s lack of cooperation with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, the components of what 
leads to the sprout of terrorist networks and capabilities for one to rise are there.  Debates 
on the most effective strategy to combat terrorism in the region need to be given a higher 
priority.  
The author draws on the analysis of studies and programs to defend her position 
that increased investments with attention to foreign aid can have a more positive long-
term effect on counterterrorism, specifically when applied to countries in Latin America.  
The role that these investments play in national security prove to be effective and 
eventually reduce wasteful spending on expensive military programs that often backfire 
on the United States years later.  Increased coordination between recipient countries and 
the United States and consistency in aid giving are key to making foreign assistance as a 
counterterrorism strategy successful. 
4
Chapter 1:
Foreign Aid an Effective Counterterrorism Strategy
What is Terrorism and Counterterrorism?
According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary terrorism is defined as “the systematic 
use of terror especially as a means of coercion.”7  It is not usual to provide a dictionary 
definition of a term in academic writing, but in this case, a simple definition and the most 
common Americans will read, is the one in Merriam-Webster Dictionary.  Today, 
“terrorism” is in the top 10 percent of lookups on the popular dictionary website.8  It is 
needed for the case of this paper to show the complexity and difficulty of defining the 
term, and such a definition, should be taken with a grain of salt.  “Terrorism” is a term 
that dates back so many centuries we often wonder why is it so difficult to define, and 
why are there so many different definitions for it.
Russians in the late 1800s used new communication and transportation 
technologies to commit assassinations.9  In the 1920s there was vast anti-colonial 
movements throughout the world that used terrorist warfare.  It was not until the late 
1960s, according to Bruce Hoffman, that the “internationalization of terrorism reached 
new levels.”10  At this time tactics had evolved, and now groups were using hijacking and 
7 Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, s.v. “Terrorism,” accessed March 10, 2013, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/terrorism.
8 Ibid., scroll over “Popularity.”
9 Peter Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The global politics of cooperation and contestation 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), pg. 1.
10 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), ch. 3.
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hostage taking.  These new tactics often involved foreign nationals and received an 
abundant amount of media coverage.11  By the twenty-first century, religious terrorism 
expanded the transnational reaches of groups that often had worldwide supporters. These 
terrorist groups have the ability to reach global crowds and recruit to join their cause and 
join in their violence.12  
There are so many different components and characteristics to terrorism that 
having just one simple definition is extremely difficult.  Despite the fact that it has been 
difficult to reach a generally consensus definition of terrorism, almost all definitions have 
three generally agreed upon understandings.  The first is “acts of violence committed by 
nongovernmental agencies.”13  The second is “for religious, political, or ideological 
goals.”14  And lastly, the third is “by creating fear (terror) by deliberately targeting or 
disregarding the safety of noncombatant civilians.”15  According to Michael Kraft and 
Edward Marks, “the word terrorism is politically and emotionally charged, and this 
greatly compounds the difficulty of providing a precise definition.”16  
Much like terrorism, the term “counterterrorism,” which is one of the most 
important terms used in this thesis, is equally as difficult to define.  It is important to have 
an understanding of both terms in order to fully grasp the difficulty in implementing 
strategies.  In Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response author Paul 
Wilkinson, former Director of the University of St. Andrews Centre for the Study of 
11 Ibid.
12 Peter Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The global politics of cooperation and contestation 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), pg. 1.
13 Michael B. Kraft and Edward Marks, U.S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What 





Terrorism and Political Violence, writes, “There is no universally applicable counter-
terrorism policy for democracies. Every conflict involving terrorism has its own unique 
characteristics.”17  
Most Americans had not used the term counterterrorism until after the attacks on 
September 11th, 2001, many had not even ever heard of “counterterrorism.”  Today, this 
is a term that resonates all over the news, popular television shows, and other media 
outlets; it is nearly impossible to have never heard the term “counterterrorism,” but do we 
really know what it means?  According to Jason Rineheart, a Freelance Writer 
specializing in counterterrorism and Middle East security, counterterrorism is a term that 
is very difficult to define and an all-inclusive doctrine.18  In the U.S. Department of the 
Army Field Manual’s glossary it is defined as, “Operations that include the offensive 
measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”19  This definition is 
the same for counterterrorism policy and counterterrorism operations.  
What if foreign assistance was used to fight terrorist threats?  Well, one of the 
tools for counterterrorism is foreign assistance.  This chapter looks into foreign aid as a 
counterterrorism strategy by analyzing different forms of foreign aid that play a role in 
counterterrorism, how it works, and why it is effective if implemented correctly.  The 
United States has provided various forms of foreign assistance to countries around the 
world.  Not all counterterrorism strategies are the same because no two countries are the 
same, and foreign assistance needs to be looked at similarly.  Counterterrorism strategies 
17 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, New York: Routledge, 2006, 
p. 203.
18 Jason Rineheart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 5 (2010), 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122/html.
19 United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication, 2006), Glossary-4.
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need to be looked at and implemented in a case-by-case basis in order to determine the 
effectiveness of foreign aid as a counterterrorism policy.
U.S. Foreign Assistance as a Counterterrorism Policy
Historically, terrorist groups have usually established themselves in countries with 
weak or failed regimes, and therefore, foreign assistance has become an instrument of 
U.S. counterterrorism policy by helping unstable regimes build capacity.  
Counterterrorism is one of the United State’s front line policies in order to create a safe 
global environment, and counterterrorism aid is one of the types of U.S. counterterrorism 
policies.  This is when the United States supports counterterrorist capabilities in countries 
that otherwise would not have the means to combat insurgent groups without assistance.20 
Some types of aid could be direct military assistance and others could be as general as 
assisting the recipient government with their health programs, something that will be 
discussed later in the chapter.  Therefore, it is important to know whether foreign aid is 
effective. 
There are various types of foreign assistance, but for this thesis a 2004 
Congressional Research Service report, which organizes programs into five major 
categories, will be used.  The report titled, “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of 
U.S. Programs and Policy,” lists the categories, which could overlap each other, as: 
“bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting U.S. political security goals, 
humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid.”21  Bilateral 
20 Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler, and Javed Younas, "Foreign Aid as Counterterrorism Policy," 
Published Articles & Papers, paper 153 (2010), http://research.create.usc.edu/published_papers/153.
21 Larry Nowels and Curt Tarnoff, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2005, accessed October 20, 2014, 
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development assistance, which is the largest, is designed to “foster sustainable broad-
based economic progress and social stability in developing countries.”  Bilateral 
development assistance is viewed as long-term efforts that effect the prevention of future 
crises from developing.  The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the Peace Corps are some 
examples of U.S. institutions that fall under this category.  The next category, economic 
aid supporting U.S. political and security objectives is the second largest aid program, 
which has a primary purpose of meeting special U.S. economic, political, or security 
interests.22  The Economic Support Fund (ESF) is where the bulk of these funds come 
from and targets countries of importance in the war on terrorism.  ESF funds have 
supported the Middle East Peace Process, and can be used for development projects or 
cash transfers to help countries stabilize their economies.  Programs that provide law 
enforcement activities, training, and equipment, as well as, anti-terrorism programs and 
weapons proliferation-related activities are funded through this category of foreign 
assistance.  Humanitarian assistance, the third category, makes up twelve percent of 
foreign assistance.23  Unlike development assistance, humanitarian assistance has three 
programs that are devoted largely to immediate relief during humanitarian emergencies: 
the refugee program administered by the Department of State, and the Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance and Office of Transition Initiatives administered by USAID.  Food 
assistance programs also fall under this category.  Multilateral assistance is the smallest 
category of foreign assistance, which together with other donor countries, finances 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/98-916.pdf.
22 Ibid., 5-6.
23 Ibid., 6. 
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multilateral development projects.24  The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and multilateral development banks, like 
the World Bank, are all program implementing international organizations that are 
recipients of multilateral assistance funds.  The last category of foreign assistance is 
military assistance, which makes up twenty-three percent of foreign assistance.  The CRS 
report states that the U.S. “provides military assistance to U.S. friends and allies to help 
them acquire U.S. military equipment and training.”25  Military assistance is made up of 
three main programs: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), a grant program that helps 
governments acquire military equipment from the U.S. or access equipment directly 
through U.S. commercial channels; the International Military Education and Training 
program offers military training to foreign military officers and personnel through a grant 
process; Peacekeeping funds, which are used for non-United Nations (U.N.) operations 
and training.
Following September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration emphasized the 
importance of foreign aid on the global war on terror, and highlighted thirty “front-line” 
states receiving U.S. assistance as a priority for the war on terrorism.26  According to the 
2006 National Security Strategy, America’s national interest is “to assist the world’s poor 
citizens and least developed nations and help integrate them into the global economy.”27  
U.S. foreign assistance has supported peace processes in the Middle East by providing 
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 7.
26 Larry Nowels and Curt Tarnoff, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2005, accessed October 20, 2014, 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/98-916.pdf, 2.
27 The United States National Security Strategy 2006, accessed December 4, 2014, 
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf, 32. 
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assistance to Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians; it has supported the 
“democratization and stability” of countries like Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo, and 
Liberia; in chapter three of this thesis, the author will discuss U.S. assistance to Colombia 
and Latin American countries.28  The 2006 National Security Strategy also argued that 
foreign assistance “reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing the long-term threats to 
our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.”29  
The Bush Administration emphasized that through foreign assistance the United States 
would be more effective in strengthening responsible governments and thus promoting its 
national interests. 
Countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq have received millions of United 
States dollars in foreign aid towards securing U.S. interests in the Middle East and South 
Asia. Some argue that the assistance that the United States gives to these countries has 
helped the U.S. fight the war on terror.  Some policymakers and academics believe that 
through United States foreign aid, receiving countries help promote stability in the 
region.  A 2011 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report stated that, the goal 
of U.S. assistance in these countries is “to create the conditions for a more stable, 
democratic government capable of resisting attempts by Al Qaeda and other insurgent 
groups from returning and establishing safe havens from which to launch attacks on the 
U.S. homeland.”30  In turn, much of the United States’ generosity has been offset by 
widespread anti-American sentiment. 
28 Larry Nowels and Curt Tarnoff, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2005, accessed October 20, 2014, 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/98-916.pdf, 2.
29 The United States National Security Strategy 2006, accessed December 4, 2014, 
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf, 32.
30 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to 
Afghanistan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011), 5.
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Given today’s political climate and budget issues, it is important to answer the 
question of whether foreign aid is effective or not.  Today, the United States’ foreign aid 
budget makes up less than one percent of our entire budget,31 but the “$50 billion that the 
U.S. spends on foreign aid,”32 is still a lot of money.  Politicians are left with the 
questions, which programs are effective, what should be cut, what can be fixed or 
changed?  Let’s take Pakistan, for example. It has been one of the leading recipients of 
U.S. foreign assistance.33  In 2009, Congress passed an act to authorize the President to 
give “$1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary aid to Pakistan for FY2010 through FY2014.”34  
That Osama bin Laden, the U.S.’s most wanted terrorist, had been living in Pakistan is a 
clear sign that U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan failing somewhere.  The question then 
arises, is U.S. foreign aid an effective tool of counterterrorism policy? 
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler, and Javed Younas wrote a paper for 
CREATE Homeland Security Center, an interdisciplinary national research center based 
at the University of Southern California, in November 2010.  Their paper titled, “Foreign 
Aid as Counterterrorism Policy,” investigates the role that U.S. foreign aid plays in 
counterterrorism.  The authors present “a model where foreign aid bolsters a developing 
country’s proactive counterterrorism efforts against a resident transnational terrorist 
group.”35  They have divided the model into three stages with “three active agents: the 
31 Robert Goodwin, “A new strategy for solving America’s foreign aid problem,” The Washington Post, 
August 3, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-leadership/a-new-strategy-for-solving-
americas-foreign-aid-problem/2011/08/03/gIQAy9vyrI_story.html. 
32 “Can’t Afford Foreign Aid, or Can’t Afford to Cut It?” New York Times, August 15, 2012, Room for 
Debate, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/15/cant-afford-foreign-aid-or-cant-afford-to-cut-
it. 
33 Congressional Research Service, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2012), Summary.
34 Ibid.
35 Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler, and Javed Younas, "Foreign Aid as Counterterrorism Policy," 
Published Articles & Papers, paper 153 (2010), http://research.create.usc.edu/published_papers/153.
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aid-giving home country (H), the aid-recipient foreign country (F), and the terrorists.”36  
In their model, the two countries involved are free to choose their own counterterrorism 
efforts.
In stage one, the aid-giving country allocates resources to general assistance, 
counterterrorism tied aid, and defensive measures at home.  The authors also show in 
their model that “general assistance limits regime instability, but at the expense of foreign 
proactive measures against the common terrorist threat.”37  The opposite goes to show for 
tied aid, as it “increases these proactive measures, but at the expense of regime 
stability.”38  In stage two, once the recipient country has received the aid from the donor 
country, it decides on its own proactive campaign efforts against the common terrorist 
threat.  In the third and final stage of the model, the terrorist groups then direct their 
attacks to the donor and recipient countries.  In this stage the terrorists decide their 
“attacks on the two countries’ interests based on its targeting preferences and the 
countries’ counterterrorism allocations.”39  The authors found that the recipient country’s 
counterterrorism effort reduces the likelihood of attacks to the donor country, but the 
donor country’s defensive measures raise the likelihood of attacks to the recipient 
country.
One interesting finding that the model showed was the interdependency that is 
created by foreign aid as a counterterrorism policy.  Greater counterterrorism-tied aid 
from the donor country increases the proactive measures of the recipient country and 
36 Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler, and Javed Younas, "Foreign Aid as Counterterrorism Policy," 





regime instability.  The opposite happens when general aid is greater: The recipient 
country’s proactive measures are reduced and so is the regime instability in the recipient 
country.40  In other words, the authors found that giving a country that is occupied by 
transnational terrorists aid to combat these terrorists, increases regime instability, but at 
the same time, increases the counterterrorism efforts the country makes.  In these cases, 
“general aid assumes an increased importance in fighting a common terrorist threat.”41  
The authors concluded that countries that are terrorist targets should bolster their 
proactive measures through tied aid to countries where these terrorist groups reside.  
Given that there are so many targeted countries, counterterrorism aid creates global 
benefits because the terrorism is reduced.  They do warn that, if “the wrong mix of 
general and tied aid is given, then sufficient regime instability can produce a global 
public bad to all targeted countries as more terrorism results.”42  The authors suggest that, 
“The fight against transnational terrorism must develop a judicious mix of homeland 
defenses and counterterrorism foreign assistance.”43
In Analytics and Action in Afghanistan, authors Thomas Blau, a professor at The 
Johns Hopkins University Advanced Academic Programs, and Daryl Liskey take a deep 
look into why U.S. aid to Afghanistan is not working successfully.  They believe that 
providing underdeveloped counties development assistance (as the U.S. has done in the 
past) in order to “mitigate causes of instability,”44 may not be the answer for the problems 
in Afghanistan because “The evidence [they] find does not convincingly demonstrate that 
40 Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler, and Javed Younas, "Foreign Aid as Counterterrorism Policy," 




44 Thomas Blau and Daryl Liskey, “Analytics and Action in Afghanistan,” PRISM 1. No.4 (2010), 41.
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development assistance contributed to short-term stability in Afghanistan.”45  Blau and 
Liskey cite a study done by Andrew Wilder that found there is little evidence that 
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan would lead to reducing insurgency.46  When it 
comes to Afghanistan, they believe that understanding the root causes for why there are 
insurgencies and instability in the country, will not lead to successful counterterrorism 
programs. 
Another team of experts, Nielson et al, argues that foreign aid plays a much larger 
role in violent uprisings of rebels.  They believe that severe decreases in foreign aid 
revenues inadvertently shift the domestic balance of power in a country and in turn create 
more violence.  The authors argue that “aid shocks,” or increases in foreign aid received 
by a country, give rebels more to bargain over with the government.  The government 
then gives the rebels what they want, but since the aid is temporary, it cannot continue its 
commitment to the rebels and violence breaks out.47  This is relevant because these 
conflicts often lead to unstable regimes. 
They take Mali, for example. In the 1970s and 1980s, Mali became heavily 
dependent on foreign assistance (more than 30 percent of its budget came from foreign 
assistance and was often the largest source of revenue) due to desertification and severe 
droughts.48  The Tuareg people, nomads of the Sahara region, were greatly affected by 
this aid. In 1989, foreign assistance to Mali was drastically reduced, weakening the 
government.  Consequently, the government’s assistance provided to the Tuareg was 
45 Ibid., 49. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Richard A. Nielsen, Michael G. Findley, Zachary S. Davis, Tara Candland, and Daniel L. Nielson, 




reduced and a rebellion against the government began in 1990.  Since then, Mali has been 
plagued with violent uprisings that have weakened the government even more. Al-Qaeda 
has found its safe haven in the country.  In March 2012, Tuareg rebels captured a large 
portion of northern Mali with the support of two extremist Islamic groups, one being Al-
Qaeda.49  Eventually, the Islamist group fell out with the Tuareg rebels and gained control 
of northern Mali, enforcing Islamic law.  Today, Al-Qaeda is occupying an area in 
northern Mali the size of France and using its control to recruit throughout Africa, the 
Middle East, and Europe.50  United Nations correspondent and author, Joseph A. Klein, 
argues that northern Mali will eventually become the current version of Afghanistan in 
the 1990s, where terrorists use it as a base for plotting, training, and launching attacks.  
Mali can serve an example that cutting foreign aid to a country could lead to more 
violence and instability. 
It is shown in the theories and analysis presented above that foreign aid as a 
counterterrorism strategy needs to be used as a case-by-case basis. In Counterterrorism 
by Ronald Crelinsten, he presents five different types of counterterrorism.  The last form 
of counterterrorism that he presents is what he calls, “long-term counterterrorism.”  He 
argues that while “there is no quick fix to the problem of terrorism. Coercive strategies 
can take individual terrorists out of circulation or even lead to the demise of particular 
terrorist groups.”51  Aid, he states, plays an important role in the “counterterrorism efforts 
aimed at undercutting the ideological fuel that drives terrorist radicalization and 
49 “UN Official Calls for Political Dialogue To Resolve Mali Crisis,” RTT News, December 6, 2012, 
http://www.rttnews.com/2018656/un-official-calls-for-political-dialogue-to-resolve-mali-crisis.aspx?
type=gn&utm_source=google&utm_campaign=sitemap. 
50 Joseph A. Klein, “Islamist Jihadists Occupy Mali With Impunity,” Canada Free Press, December 6, 
2012, http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/51565. 
51 Ronald Crelinsten, Counterterrorism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009, 194.
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recruitment in a world of haves and have-nots.”52  Crenlinsten calls for a comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy that includes foreign aid.  If governments who receive foreign 
aid have reduced the presence of insurgent groups in their country, then foreign aid as a 
counterterrorism policy is effective.  Granted, foreign aid to some countries in specific 
should be modified and looked at as a case-by-case basis in order to prevent uprisings 
and dependency.  Once we determine the effectiveness of foreign aid as a 
counterterrorism policy, Congress and policy makers can make complex decisions on the 
allocation of U.S. dollars for specific aid programs.
U.S. Bilateral Development as a Counterterrorism Policy
Countries in the Middle East or countries plagued with Muslim extremism are 
often the recipients of economic and military assistance.  What about countries in Africa, 
Asia, or Latin America?  These countries have often received non-military, humanitarian 
and bilateral development assistance.  In the United States, the Department of State and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are the leading 
agencies for this type of aid. With a budget request of $46.2 billion for the Department of 
State and USAID in fiscal year 2015, the United States is making significant investments 
in humanitarian and development aid.53  Just over 1 percent of the total budget requested 
by President Barack Obama, these agencies and the several accounts or initiatives that 
fall under them promote “American leadership and national security, diplomatic, and 
development priorities in pursuit of stability and prosperity.”54  The goal is to expand 
52Ibid., 199.




opportunities that promote U.S. interests in countries around the world, and build 
partnerships that help protect these interests.  
The United States is consistently the world’s leader in foreign assistance 
contributions; in 2012 it spent $30.2 billion in aid disbursements.55  In 2010 the United 
Nations set a target for countries to spend 0.7 percent of their gross national income 
(GNI) on development aid.  The U.S. is often criticized for its contributions because 
despite being the largest donor, when compared to the country’s GNI, its current 
development aid budget is 0.2 percent of the GNI.56  The table below from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) shows the net 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) debt relief provided by its Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) members.57  The data is presented from the highest 
contributing DAC member to the least.  The chart below the table illustrates the top ten 
highest contributors based on this data, this shows the significantly higher contributions 
by the United States.  Notwithstanding foreign assistance being merely 0.2 percent of 
U.S. GNI, the United States surpasses the next highest contributor, the United Kingdom, 
by over $16 billion.  Despite what the critics say about the percentage of U.S. 
contributions, the entire burden of global development should not fall completely in the 
hands of one country. 
Table 1.
55 Claire Provost, “Aid from OECD countries – who gives the most and how has it changed?” The 
Guardian Website (2011): accessed May 3, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/apr/06/aid-oecd-given  . 
56 Ibid.




*Note: Chart is based on data from the OECD Aid (development) statistics for Net ODA 
debt relief provided by DAC countries in 2012.58 
The United States Agency for International Development and the Department of 
State seek to protect U.S. national security, strengthen the U.S. economy, and combat 
58 Ibid.
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global challenges.59  For 2015, the President’s budget highlights funding to maintain U.S. 
global leadership as it responds to the crisis in Syria and the conflicts plaguing the 
Middle East and North Africa.60  President Obama announced in 2013 a new initiative, 
Power Africa, where the United States would commit $7 billion in financial support over 
the next five years to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa.61  This new initiative 
will bring together the U.S. government, six African countries, and private sector partners 
to attract investment in Africa’s energy sector and expand the markets for U.S. goods in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.62  The budget calls for $3 billion to fund support for United Nations 
and $150 million for a new peacekeeping account separate from UN-peacekeeping 
commitments.63  Over $8 billion was requested for global health initiatives and over $3 
billion for development assistance programs have been requested for fiscal year 2015.64  
The United States currently supports 6.7 million people on HIV antiretroviral therapy, 
and supports funding for maternal and child survival programs.  Another initiative started 
by President Obama is Feed the Future, which addresses “the root causes of hunger and 
poverty through agriculture development, resilience, and nutrition programs intended to 
reduce extreme poverty and malnutrition and increase food security for millions of 
families by 2015.”65  These are just a few of the several U.S. initiatives that seek to 
59 “The State Department and USAID Budget,” USAID.gov, last modified March 4, 2014, 
http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/223056.pdf.
60 “Department of State and Other International Programs,” WhiteHouse.gov, accessed May 3, 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/state.pdf. 
61 “Fact Sheet: Power Africa,” WhiteHouse.gov, last modified June 30, 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/30/fact-sheet-power-africa. 
62 “Department of State and Other International Programs,” WhiteHouse.gov, accessed May 3, 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/state.pdf.
63 Ibid.  
64 “InterAction Federal Budget Table,” InterAction.org, last modified April 28, 2014, 
http://www.interaction.org/document/interaction-federal-budget-table. 
65 “Department of State and Other International Programs,” WhiteHouse.gov, accessed May 3, 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/state.pdf.
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provide development aid and other humanitarian assistance, including refugee relief, 
climate change, educational exchanges, poverty reduction, economic growth, and science, 
technology and innovation developments.66  
U.S. Perception in Foreign Countries Receiving Assistance
In 1963, the late American Enterprise Institute political scientist and presidential 
advisor, Edward Banfield, published a report, “American Foreign Aid Doctrines.”  In the 
report, Banfield sets out to examine the doctrines that justify U.S. non-military foreign 
assistance.  A critic of the idea of justifying aid on the ground that it would contribute to 
national security, Banfield believes that this position is based on two incompatible 
doctrines.67  The doctrine of indirect influence, which “asserts that national security will 
be promoted by using aid to transform fundamentally the cultures and institutions of the 
recipient countries.”68  And secondly, the doctrine of direct influence, which “takes the 
cultures and institutions of the recipient countries as given and seeks to achieve the 
purpose (promotion of national security) by bringing influence to bear directly either 
upon the governments of the countries concerned or upon their public opinions.”  
Contrary to the positions discussed in this thesis, Banfield believes that even if economic 
growth occurs, “it will not necessarily lead to the spread of freedom and democracy.”69  
The scholar believes that the idea that a citizen from an impoverished country receiving 
U.S. aid would feel grateful because the United States has saved him or her from 
66 Ibid. 
67 Edward C. Banfield, “American Foreign Aid Doctrines,” American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 





starvation, for example, is unrealistic.70  In the following section this thesis is going to 
focus on one specific type of U.S. bilateral development aid, the global health initiatives 
in order to give an example of how, contrary to Edward Banfield, foreign assistance does 
have a positive effect on the perception of donor countries.
One of the largest accounts within U.S. global health initiatives is the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). With the creation of PEPFAR by President 
George W. Bush, the United States has been the world’s leader in the goal to achieve an 
AIDS-free generation.71  The United States is also the largest donor to the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, an international financing institution that fights 
the three diseases by partnering with governments, civil society, and the private sector.72  
Given the continued support by the United States to the Global Fund, the institution 
together with PEPFAR have achieved significant results, “of the estimated 9.7 million 
individuals in low- and middle-income countries who currently receive treatment, nearly 
9.1 million receive support through PEPFAR bilateral programs, the Global Fund, or 
both.”73
In the recent study, “Doing Well by Doing Good: The Impact of Foreign Aid on 
Foreign Public Opinion,” published in March 2014, Benjamin Goldsmith, Yusaku 
Horiuchi, and Terence Wood seek to answer, “Does foreign aid extended by one country 
improve that country’s image among populations of recipient countries?”74  Answering 
70 Ibid., 28. 
71 “About PEPFAR,” PEPFAR.gov, accessed on May 3, 2014, http://www.pepfar.gov/about/index.htm. 
72 “About the Global Fund,” TheGlobalFund.org, accessed on May 3, 2014, 
http://theglobalfund.org/en/about/. 
73 “Latest PEPFAR Results,” PEPFAR.org, accessed May 3, 2014, 
http://www.pepfar.gov/funding/results/index.htm.
74 Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Yusaku Horiuchi, and Terence Wood, “Doing Well by Doing Good: The Impact 
of Foreign Aid on Foreign Public Opinion,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9 (2014): 87. 
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this question is key to understanding why foreign assistance is an effective 
counterterrorism strategy.  A donor country has the ability to sway the minds of potential 
terrorist recruits when they are providing life saving assistance to villages and citizens.  
In other words, if a person has directly or indirectly knowingly received assistance from 
the United States, he or she is less likely to have negative sentiments about the U.S. and 
therefore less likely to be recruited by a terrorist organization with a mission to harm the 
U.S. and it’s interests.  The study acknowledges that in order to achieve a range of 
objectives in foreign relations, countries must have a positive image of themselves among 
foreign publics; foreign aid seems to be the most effective tool.75  Goldsmith, Horiuchi, 
and Wood use PEPFAR because it is an ongoing aid program and it is given across 
several different countries and contexts.76  PEPFAR is different from aid programs that 
are a response to a natural disaster or a result of a military conflict.  It is important to 
investigate the impact that consistent foreign aid has on the public opinion of recipient 
countries. The authors prove in their study that in the case of PEPFAR since it is 
“targeted, sustained, effective, and visible”77 it has had a positive affect on the opinions of 
recipient country populations.   
It is believed that foreign aid can serve as a leveraging tool over recipient 
countries and political leaders to advance commercial or foreign policy goals important to 
the donor country.78  In “Doing Well by Doing Good,” the authors state that “by instilling 
gratitude in those it helps or through promoting an image of positive action, compassion 






in recipient countries.”79  Programs that meet similar conditions to PEPFAR would “be 
more likely to affect opinion among recipient populations about the donor state.”80  So 
why would the results of this study be important to the United States policy makers?  The 
answer is simple, if the comparably small amount of funding provided in the foreign aid 
budget (the Department of Defense has a $495.6 billion budget request for FY15)81, 
specifically to programs like PEPFAR, could have this kind of affect on the foreign 
opinion of the United States, then imagine the effects it could have on our national 
security if it were to be expanded.  
Concluding Thoughts
With the growth of terrorism in Latin America and regime instability in South 
American countries, Muslim extremist leaders in the Middle East may see this as the 
perfect opportunity to introduce their radical ideology.  Countries like Iran have been 
attempting to infiltrate their anti-American principles on Latin American leaders for 
years.  I previously stated that terrorist groups feed off instability and poverty, South 
America has been afflicted with both.  Given that the United States shares the Western 
Hemisphere with Latin American countries, it is important that it maintains a positive 
public opinion with its neighbors to the south.  This study by Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and 
Wood, shows that with consistent and stable investments in development U.S. assistance 
could prove to be successful.  The United States cannot let what happened in the Middle 
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 95.
81 “Fiscal Year 2015 Budget of the U.S. Government,” WhiteHouse.gov, accessed May 3, 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/budget.pdf, pg. 57.
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East to occur in South America, we are at a crucial time when the need to make these 
types of investments in the region can make the biggest impact.
Fiscally constrained policy-makers in the United States need to make decisions on 
funding programs that protect our national interests through militarization, or funding 
programs that promote an image of positive action.  As Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood 
argued that “if targeted, sustained, effective, and visible aid gives the best chance of 
influence, this may compel great powers to actually do good, and to be seeing doing so, 
in order to do well in their global competition for influence.”82 It’s like that saying, “you 
catch more flies with honey than with vinegar.”  Enhancing U.S. power can also come 
from improving the United States’ image through aid and not just by having the world’s 
largest army, this can be a more effective counterterrorism strategy in the future. 
82 Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Yusaku Horiuchi, and Terence Wood, “Doing Well by Doing Good: The Impact 
of Foreign Aid on Foreign Public Opinion,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9 (2014): 90.
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Chapter 2:
Terrorism and Counterterrorism in India
India’s Troubled History
India gained its independence from the British on August 15, 1947 when it was 
partitioned.83  Most of the unrest and conflict affecting India are a consequence of the 
partition and the inability to have a Muslim-Hindu unity.84  In India, the Muslims are 
poorer than the Hindus, and less educated with a literacy rate less than the national 
average.85  In January 2013, the author had the opportunity to travel to India for a month, 
and through conversing with New Delhi locals she learned that a majority of Indians 
consider themselves middle class. Unfortunately, there is no real Muslim middle class in 
India, part of this is due to the lack of Muslim entrepreneurs and the under-representation 
of Muslims in professions and government services. “Forty percent of Muslims in cities 
lived below the poverty line; the situation in the countryside was not much better.”3 
Hindu fundamentalism played a large role in putting the Muslim minority of India on a 
defensive mentality. In the Jammu and Kashmir region, which we will discuss in depth 
later in this paper, the Muslim majority was “increasingly expressing its aspirations in 
religious terms.”3  Pakistan has largely aided the militant groups in Kashmir through the 
83 Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 19.
84 Ibid., 42. 
85 Ibid., 641.
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Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (PSI), which runs camps were terrorists could be 
trained.86
From 2001 to 2005 there was a total of 22,688 terrorism related incidents in 
Jammu and Kashmir, and the Northeastern States of India alone.87  Of these incidents, 
18,791 people were killed.  In a 2011 assessment by the South Asia Terrorism Portal they 
state, “The worst and steadily worsening of conflicts in India is, without a dispute, the 
Maoist insurgency, principally spearheaded by the Muslim-friendly, Communist Party of 
India – Maoist (CPI-M).”88  The CPI-M is responsible for nearly 45 percent of the 
country’s terrorist activities, and it has caused nearly the same amount of deaths as al-
Qa’ida in Iraq.89 The assessment also states that of India’s 636 Districts, 310 of them are 
affected by “chronic activity, including subversion, by insurgent and terrorist groupings.” 
In 2012 the Institute for Economics and Peace along with the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, or START, released the  “Global 
Terrorism Index (GTI),” which ranks nations according to their terrorist activity.90  India 
ranked fourth in the report, only after Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The December 7, 
2006 train bombings in Mumbai ranked fifth in the GTI highest ranked incidents.91  The 
Lashkar-e-Taiba group was responsible for these bombings, killing 187 people and 
injuring 817 in a string of seven blasts that spanned 56 kilometers. 
86 Ibid., 642. 
87 “Country Report: India,” United Nations Asia and Far East Institute, 
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*NOTE: Institute for Economics & Peace, Table 6 shows the ten countries most affected 
by terrorism in 2011. India is ranked number four. 92
Table 3.
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*NOTE: Institute for Economics & Peace’s Table 8 shows the worst terrorist attacks 
from 2002-2011. The Mumbai attacks in December 2006 are ranked number five.93
India has been plagued by both foreign and internal terrorism, and most of the 
foreign terrorism deals with the dispute over Kashmir with Pakistan.  The internal and 
external terrorism both have a nationalist or separatist aspiration, but in “the case of 
Kashmir, the ideology is largely religious (Islamic) whilst the other is political 
(communist).”94 Often groups of each ideology support each other’s causes. In an 
October 2009 interview, the supreme commander of CPI-M explained that the Islamic 
jihadist movements of today are a product of imperialism and the CPI-M supports the 
“struggle of Muslim countries and people against imperialism.”95 Lets take a look at each 
of the five regions in India that have had long term terrorist activities: Jammu and 
Kashmir, Western India, Northern and Northwestern India, The Seven Sister States, and 
South India. By doing this we can understand the various different types of terrorist 
groups in the country and better understand India’s counterterrorism strategies.
Terrorism in India
The conflict in the state of Jammu and Kashmir is one of India’s oldest 
unresolved international conflicts.  In 1947 the subcontinent was partitioned between 
Hindu-dominated India and the Muslim state of Pakistan.  Since the partition, the 
territory of Jammu and Kashmir has remained a constant conflict between the two 
93 Ibid., 15. 
94 Ibid., 17. 
95 Rahul Pandita, “We Shall Certainly Defeat the Government,” OPEN Magazine, posted October 17, 2009, 
accessed September 14, 2014, http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/nation/we-shall-certainly-defeat-
the-government.  
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countries.96  Given that there are so many insurgent groups in the region, each wanting 
different outcomes, a BBC news report, “The Future of Kashmir?” provides online 
readers with 7 scenarios for the Kashmir conflict.97  Some want independence from both 
India and Pakistan, others want to join Pakistan, and some just want greater independence 
from the Indian government.  One of the most organized terrorist groups in the region is 
the Islamic fundamentalist group, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), led by Syed Salauddin,98 
which supports the liberation of Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan.  On the START 
terrorist organization profile for HM it states that according to Pakistani reposts, it is 
estimated that HM controls about 60 percent of terrorists operating in Kashmir.99  
Another Kashmir and Pakistan based terrorist group is the Islamic, Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT), which has approximately 300 members, is responsible for the November 
2008 Mumbai attack that claimed the lives of over 150 people.100  This is not the first 
time Mumbai has been the target of a terrorist attack though.  On March 12, 1993, twelve 
serial blasts killed 257 people and injured 713.101  In Western India, the city of Mumbai is 
96 “India – Pakistan: Troubled relations,” BBC News Online, last updated May 19, 2011, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/default.stm.
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100 Ashley J. Tellis, “The Menace That is Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:  
Policy Outlook, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf. 




the most targeted by terrorist organizations.  Since 1993 there have been fourteen terrorist 
attacks in Mumbai claiming 710 lives and injuring 2,393 people.102
In the mountainous region of northeastern India, an area known as The Seven 
Sisters, violence has plagued the states since the partition in 1947.103  Ever since the 
country of Bangladesh was partitioned off, fighting in the states of Assam and Nagaland 
has been particularly high.104  In an area greatly affected by poverty, tribal friction due to 
the number of religious and cultural differences has led to several groups demanding 
independence.  One of the largest terrorist groups in the region is known as the United 
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which has approximately three thousand members 
according to the START Terrorist Organization Profile.105  ULFA is responsible for 
several terrorist attacks targeting political opponents, and has the dual goal of 
establishing Assam as a separate country with a socialist government.  The organization 
has managed to establish relationships with two other non-state groups, Kachin 
Independence Army and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland, as well as, gain 
the support of some in the ruling party of Assam, Assam Gana Parishad.106  
One issue with the Seven Sisters region of India is the amount of indigenous 
tribes.  The Nagas alone are made up of some seventeen tribes and over twenty sub-
102 “Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai since 1993,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
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tribes, and each tribe speaks a different language.107  Nagaland attained Indian statehood 
in 1963 and since then there has been continued violence in the state.  Nagaland is known 
as the most volatile state of the Seven Sisters; there is violence between militant groups 
themselves and the militant groups against the Indian government. In the period between 
2000 and 2012, a total of 182 civilians had been killed in terrorist related attacks.108  
Between the seven states that make up the Seven Sisters, Nagaland, Assam, Tripura, 
Manipur, and Mizoram, there is a total of 110 terrorist, insurgent and extremist groups 
according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal.109  Another key group in the region is the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) located in the state of Manipur.  The PLA has less than 
3,000 members, and since it’s founding, has engaged in a guerilla insurgent campaign 
against the Indian government in order to gain independence for Manipur from India.110  
Unlike the groups in Nagaland, the PLA claims to be a trans-tribal organization that seeks 
to unite all of the tribes in northeast India in order to oppose India’s occupation of 
Manipur.  In 1979, the PLA created a political wing called the Revolutionary People’s 
Front that “still runs a government-in-exile out of Bangladesh.”111  In 2000, the PLA 
militants rejected a cease-fire offer, and therefore it is expected that attacks against the 
government of India will continue. The PLA is feared to be incorporating the use of 
107 “Nagaland Backgrounder,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
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108 “Nagaland Assessments – Year 2013,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/nagaland/index.html. 
109 “India – Terrorist, insurgent and extremist groups,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/index.html. 
110 “Terrorist Organization Profile: People’s Liberation Army,” National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?
id=4590.   
111 Ibid.
33
improvised explosive devices after recent arrests of militants have found explosives and 
bomb making materials. 
Southern India has also been affected by terrorist activity.  In Andhra Pradesh, the 
Naxalites, or People’s War Group (PWG), is a communist/socialist group that is 
responsible for killing “an average of 60 civilians… and a dozen police officers each year 
during their active period.”112  Today, the PWG has joined the Communist Party of India-
Maoist whose goal is to create an independent communist state extending from the 
Nepalese border to Andhra Pradesh.  It is believed that the Naxalites “have 9,000-10,000 
armed fighters, with access to about 6,500 firearms.”113  In 2005 there was nearly 1,600 
violent incidents involving Naxalites leading to the deaths of 669 people.  “Naxalism” 
affects 170 of India’s 602 districts.
Counterterrorism in India
India has taken several initiatives for its national counterterrorism strategy.  At the 
international level, India has played a supportive role in all United Nations related efforts 
to combat terrorism.  It has held a consistent stance on terrorism and believes that there is 
no justification for it, the fight against terrorism must be a top priority, counterterrorism 
must be long term and comprehensive, and international cooperation is key.114  In India’s 
local government there are also a few key legislations that deal with the country’s 
counterterrorism: The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967, The Armed Forces 
112 “Terrorist Organization Profile: People’s War Group,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
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(Special) Powers Act of 1967, The National Security Act of 1980, The Arms Act of 1959, 
The Explosives Act of 1884, The Explosives Substance Act of 1908, The Indian Penal 
Code of 1860, The Code of Criminal Procedures of 1973, the Anti-Hijacking Act of 
1982, and The Prevention of Money Laundering Act of 2002.115  
Now let’s take a look at just two of these pieces of legislation. The Unlawful 
Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 gives law enforcement agencies the power to deal 
with unlawful activities directed against the integrity and sovereignty of India.116  
Recently, this law has been under strict criticism from international human rights 
organization, like Human Rights Watch, for misuse of the law and new amendments that 
would worsen the abuses.  “The counterterrorism law has long been abused to detain 
suspects for excessive periods, file charges on fabricated evidence, and ban organizations 
without due process of the law,” stated Meenakshi Ganguly of Human Rights Watch.117  
The National Security Act of 1980 provides the Indian government with the power to 
detain certain persons, including foreigners, “whose action may be prejudicial to the 
defense of India, security of India, prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and 
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.”118 
Since 1989, more than 30,000 people, including civilians, terrorists, policemen, 
and army soldiers have died in Jammu and Kashmir.119  In the article, “Defeating 
Terrorism: A Study of Operational Strategy and Tactics of Police Forces in Jammu & 
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Kashmir (India),” Yateendra Singh Jafa sets out to analyze the counter-terrorism strategy 
used in Jammu and Kashmir, and prove that “the police forces can substantially debilitate 
the terrorist movement by isolating its activists from the masses and winning over the 
people.”120  According to Jafa, “the counter-terrorism strategy is simply to hunt down the 
terrorists.”121  With the use of two police forces, Border Security Force and Central 
Reserve Police Force, vulnerable areas are guarded in both a defensive and offensive 
way.  One of the issues Jafa discusses and suggests should change is the attitude of the 
Kashmir people towards the police forces.  There is a very strong dislike and distrust 
between the Muslims of Kashmir and the police forces, as they have often been the 
victims of human rights violations inflicted by the Indian police forces.122  Some of the 
other suggestions he makes are: better intelligence for planning operations, tactical 
changes, better management of processions of unarmed protesters, avoiding complaints 
of misbehavior with women, and denial of funds to terrorist groups. 
The November 20, 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai has brought an enormous 
amount of global attention to India’s terrorist incidents.  Paul Staniland states that these 
attacks “brought into clear focus the inability of the Indian security apparatus to 
anticipate and appropriately respond to major terrorist incidents.”123  Staniland argues that 
India needs to “dramatically enhance its domestic counterterrorism infrastructure,” and in 
order for there to be improvement several resources will need to be used, consistency in 
policy, and a political will is necessary. In Staniland’s article, “Improving India’s 
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Counterterrorism Policy after Mumbai,” he outlines the current structure of 
counterterrorism strategy in India and then suggests a couple of reforms. Due to the 
fragmented and inefficient Indian bureaucracy, Staniland believe that the necessary 
reforms will be extremely challenging and will require international partners.124
Ajai Sahni believes that the Indian government’s response to the Mumbai 2008 
attack does nothing “whatsoever to contain the rampage of terrorism across a country that 
remains pitifully under-policed.”125  One of Staniland’s first points in the domestic 
structure and capabilities of India’s police and internal security system is that it is highly 
fragmented and poorly coordinated.126  The policing responsibilities are left to each 
individual state that usually have their own counterterrorism and intelligence units. 
Unfortunately, these units are often poorly trained and equipped, and often officials are 
hired based on politics. The level of corruption is extremely high in India, especially with 
the police.127  
In a paper published by RAND Corporation, “The Lessons of Mumbai,” 
intelligence failures by the Indian government are one of the “key weaknesses” in the 
country’s counterterrorism structure.128  The Indian government is composed several 
agencies that deal with intelligence, central investigation, and law enforcement.  The 
Intelligence Bureau, Central Reserve Police Force, Indian Police Service, and the new 
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National Investigation Agency are all part of the Ministry of Home Affairs.129  Under the 
Prime Minister, there is the Research and Analysis Wing and the Central Bureau of 
Investigation. The focus of the Indian military is on foreign threats, but it often generates 
intelligence on domestic terrorism as well. Within the military is the National Security 
Guard that specifically deals with hostage and terrorist attack situations.130  There is a 
Multi-Agency Center, task forces, joint committees, and subsidiary intelligence bureaus 
that coordinate between the several agencies, but according to Staniland “they are often 
slow and cumbersome.”  Competition between states and the central agencies over 
resources and bureaucratic autonomy are just some of the problems. Most are 
“understaffed, undertrained, and technologically backward.”131  In the case of the 2008 
attacks, RAND reports that there was little coordination between the central security 
agencies and the local Mumbai police.132  Another problem that RAND reported is that 
the metal detectors at the CRT were of questionable reliability and despite armed officers, 
“their weapons were relatively antiquated and in short supply (one for every two 
officers).”133  Failures in the response were also evident in 2008; local contingents of the 
army arrived a full five hours after the first shots were fired.  It was not until six hours 
later, nearly 10 hours after the first shots, that the National Security Guard, the country’s 
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premier rapid-reaction force, arrived.134  The first responders were poorly equipped and 
not properly trained. 
Since the attack, India’s parliament passed the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
Act, which created the National Investigative Agency. The NIA is responsible for 
investigating terrorism and gathering and processing intelligence.135  One of the aims of 
the NIA is that it will do all of the investigative work without having to be asked to do so 
by the states.136  According to Paul Staniland, these efforts alone will have little positive 
results unless they have “three major characteristics.”137  The first is that these efforts 
need to be sustained over a long period of time.  Just because there is a new federal 
agency or set of laws does not mean that this will take care of the core problems in 
India’s counterterrorism strategy.  Years need to be dedicated to training efforts and 
institution building.  The second characteristic is that the reform efforts need to be 
properly resourced.  Given that India is a country plagued with poverty, security funding 
in the country is not sufficient, leading to undertrained and underequipped personnel, as 
well as corruption.  India needs international assistance in the form of grants to properly 
train and equip the police.  The third and final characteristic Staniland believes will bring 
positive results to India’s counterterrorism lies in the hands of political leadership.  The 
political leaders need to “push past bureaucratic and state-centric rivalries.”138  The 
electoral competition in India creates challenges that do not allow consistency and 
follow-through so that the reform process does not stall or waste resources.  There needs 
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to be oversight over the entire security apparatus, but the inefficiencies in the Indian 
bureaucracy pose a challenge. 
Another example of India’s counterterrorism strategy that can be closer looked at 
is the country’s handling of the Naxalites or Maoist uprisings.  As of 2010, the Naxalites 
have an estimated 14,000 full-time fighters and loosely control the jungle areas of eastern 
India.139 According to The Economist, three things explain the Naxalites’ rise.  The first is 
the merge between the two largest factions in 2004. Second, is the poverty affecting the 
eastern tribal communities of India. Lastly, the rapid economic growth due to mining that 
has given the group new targets for extorting cash.140  Despite calls from the central 
government to respond to the uprising, the response has been disgraceful.  In 2006 the 
Indian prime minister described the insurgency as the “single biggest internal-security 
challenge,” because unfortunately, most states are responsible for law enforcement and 
they have not done a thing.141  One of the problems is that politicians have just become 
complacent, and the worst affected states are some of India’s worst governed. The map 
below shows the different terrorist groups that can be found in India and the areas they 
affect. 
Map 1.
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In another The Economist article, one of the pitfalls of the government’s inability 
to control the insurgency is the lack of a unified government response.143  Government 
leaders are constantly debating on how to handle the uprisings. One argument is that the 
rebels pose a military threat and force should be used to bring them down. The other 
argument is that the insurgent group feeds off of the grievances of the poor and if 
development were brought to these areas, the group would dissolve. The Economist 
article suggests “a comprehensive response – which combines both security and 
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development.”63 In response to the debate, the government set up a unified command 
structure to oversee the state-level counterterrorism efforts and promised more funds for 
development projects in Naxalite dominant areas.  Like I stated earlier, the police force in 
this situation is also ineffective in containing the spread of the movement.  It was not 
until late 2009 that the government sent thousands of federal police into the worst 
affected states, but there was no success. Instead, the violence in the region escalated. It 
is believed that if simple amenities (roads, water, and schools) were provided to the tribal 
areas, the insurgent movement would diminish.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
providing assistance to citizens can sway the perception of the donor.  If the Indian 
government were to provide these simple amenities, it is a possibility that the likelihood 
of increased violence could reduce.  The state of Andhra Pradesh is an example of its 
success and the Maoist insurgency has weakened in the state.  The counterterrorism, anti-
Naxalite, police are well equipped and much better trained than the other states involved.  
Political scientists argue that the policing forces should be recruited from the region itself 
rather than bringing in men from different backgrounds and languages.63
According to the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute (UNFEI) for the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders there are a couple of measures India 
should take in order to improve its counterterrorism strategy. When it comes to 
counterterrorism tactics it states that India must have a clearly defined policy and 
absolutely no compromise when it involves terrorism; there needs to be pro-active 
measure, including pre-emptive strikes if necessary; India needs to strengthen its current 
antiterrorism laws; there needs to be punishment for those who sympathize with the 
terrorist groups and those who benefit from their actions; it should use psychological 
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warfare on terrorist groups; there should be the creation of and joining of more anti-
terrorism cooperative groups; denounce and alienate states sponsoring terrorism or not 
doing anything to control their insurgent uprisings.144   Another suggestion it makes is 
that India needs to find a balance in its laws between prosecuting perpetrators and not 
violating human rights while doing so.  In the end though, UNAFEI suggests the same 
thing that the previous specialists have suggested, India needs to have strict and effective 
enforcement of its laws.145 
U.S. – India Relations and Concluding Thoughts
After the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai the need for U.S. – India 
cooperation to counter terrorist threats in the region became more prevalent.  Given its 
proximity to countries like Pakistan, both the United States and India stand to gain from 
these cooperative efforts.  Terrorism scholar Lisa Curtis argues that “The U.S. and India 
should expand cooperation on sharing intelligence and promoting democracy and 
religious pluralism to disrupt terrorist recruitment.  They should improve cooperation on 
maritime security, cyber security, energy security, and nuclear nonproliferation to 
increase both countries’ defenses against new terrorist threats.”146  Following the Mumbai 
attacks, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations worked closely with Indian 
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security forces, and there has been an increase in intelligence sharing between the two 
countries; specifically with intelligence related to Afghanistan and Pakistan.147  
Paul Staniland believes that the relationship between India and the United States 
“should move beyond investigative collaboration and intelligence sharing into a broader 
project of training and capacity building” of India’s counterterrorism apparatus.148  
Staniland believes that of the strength of the United States is the law enforcement 
establishment that has been training other countries’ police and intelligence forces for so 
many years.  If the United States offered a small and sustained program for India that 
could bring Indian police (state and federal) to the U.S. for training and sending 
Americans to train in India, the impact on India’s law enforcement would have a much 
broader effect on increasing the professionalism of the country’s security forces.149  In 
2000 the United States and India formed the Counterterrorism Joint Working Group, 
which meets twice a year. Through this group the two countries have “exchanged 
information, training material, and methods related to interrupting terrorist financial 
networks, institutional and law enforcement steps to strengthen homeland security, border 
management and surveillance techniques, aviation security, and disaster management in 
the event of a terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction.”150
One of the obstacles in the United States – India relationship is the amount of 
distrust the two countries have with one another.  India’s issues revolve around Kashmir 
147 Paul Staniland, “Improving India’s Counterterrorism Policy after Mumbai,” Combating Terrorism 
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and the U.S. policy towards Pakistan, “which has provided training, financing and 
military and logistical support to militants fighting in Kashmir.”151  India sees 
inconsistencies in the U.S. opinion towards the Pakistan-based terrorist threat to India and 
believes that the United States has withheld information on terrorist operatives that have 
ties to Kashmiri militants.152  On the other hand, the United States is concerned with 
India’s relationship with Iran, a country that sponsors international terrorism and is 
pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities.  Despite India’s opposition to Iran’s pursuit of a 
nuclear program, it views its relationship with Iran as essential in order to prevent an 
even closer tie between Iran and Pakistan.153  In the late 1990s the two countries worked 
closely to support the Afghan Northern Alliance forces against Pakistani-supported 
Taliban.  Now, according to Lisa Curtis, the United States needs to: “increase intelligence 
sharing through established U.S. procedures for intelligence-liaison relationships”; 
“increase official diplomatic and non-governmental exchanges on improving 
counterterrorism cooperation”; “enhance U.S. – Indian cooperation in promoting 
democracy and religious pluralism as a way to disrupt recruitment and support for 
Islamist-inspired terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan”; “expand cooperative efforts on 
maritime security”; “review coordination of cyber security, energy security, and nuclear 
nonproliferation efforts to increase both countries’ security against new terrorist threats”; 
“avoid high-profile attempts to mediate the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir”; “take a 
wide view of challenges in the region and focus on broad-based regional diplomatic 
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efforts.”154  Both the United States and India would benefit greatly from working together 
on counterterrorism efforts, and Curtis believes it needs to begin with “trust and 
confidence” in each of the other’s counterterrorism strategies. 
India is often hailed as the world’s largest democracy, but the country’s human 
rights violations in the name of counterterrorism put a damper on its reputation.  “From 
1984-95, Indian security forces tortured, “disappeared,” killed, and illegally cremated 
more than 10,000 Punjabi Sikhs in counter-insurgency operations.”155  One of the 
country’s top counterterrorism experts, K.P.S. Gill, who runs the Indian counterterrorism 
institute, is known for justifying torture and murder in the name of counterterrorism.  
Often citizens in India, specifically Punjab, believe that fundamental human rights do not 
exist during insurgencies.156  In Amritsar alone, one of the cities in India I have had the 
opportunity of visiting, the Indian National Human Rights Commission has received over 
3,500 claims from victims of state-sponsored abuse.  It is unfortunate that one of the 
pride examples of democratic government, India, has a counterterrorism reputation that 
includes a “legacy of broken families, rampant police abuse, and a judicial system 
unwilling to enforce fundamental rights.”157  After a brief visit to the Supreme Court in 
India, the author found it easy to believe that the judicial system has failed some of the 
country’s one billion citizens; it seemed unorganized and chaotic.  The author noted that 
visitors were coming in and out of the courtrooms where cases were being argued, 
several cases were being presided over by one or two judges at the same time, and 
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compared to U.S. courts there was no order or organization with the way cases were 
presided over.   Human rights also need to be taken into account when implementing 
these laws in order to create trust between the people of India and the government. 
India is one of the “most ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse 
countries” in the world.158  The country “ranks third last in the region in terms of having 
the necessary formal and informal institutions in place which can create and sustain a 
peaceful environment.”159  It is inevitable that India will be hit by terrorism again, but it is 
key to not make the same mistakes in the response to the attack.  Through a partnership 
with the United States and other key allies, India could avoid disrupting the policy 
changes that have been put in place to counterterrorism.  There are existing 
counterterrorism reform efforts in India and policies that when implemented could be 
effective in the country’s prevention and response to terrorist attacks.  One thing that I 
noticed during my trip to the country was the lack of police on the streets.  In New Delhi, 
I did not notice many uniformed officers or police vehicles in heavily populated areas, 
like Connaught Circle or Dilli Haat.  United States cooperation could play an essential 
role in assisting with implementing existing laws, but the Indian government and the law 
enforcement in India needs to view the reform as a higher priority.  There needs to be a 
strict crack down on corruption and harsher consequences for accepting bribes. With a 
population of over one billion people, it is important for the government to take all the 
necessary reforms and tactics to improve its role in protecting the citizens of India.
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The Rise of Terrorism in Latin America
Latin America and India
Latin America and the Caribbean consist of thirty-three distinct countries, from 
tiny islands to massive countries in South America.  As a region it is made up of “three 
principal sub-regions: the South American continent, Central or Meso-America from 
Mexico to Panama and the Caribbean.”160  A 2013 report by the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and Caribbean of the United Nations (ECLAC) showed that Latin 
America is becoming a magnet for foreign investment with $179 billion in Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in 2013, which is the highest record for any region.161  This figure has 
declined in the first half of 2014 due to the absence of big corporate acquisitions and a 
decline in mining investments; a decline mostly concentrated in Mexico.162  Latin 
America boosts a combined Growth Domestic Product (GDP) of $4.9 trillion dollars and 
is home to 600 million inhabitants.163  With its close proximity to the United States of 
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America, attention to the rise of terrorism in Latin America has increased following the 
attacks on September 11, 2001,164 and given today’s influx of immigrants from the 
region, Latin America needs to be of higher concern to U.S. diplomats. 
Map 2.
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49
*NOTE: Congressional Research Services165
With a landmass of five times that of India’s and nearly half the population, Latin 
America is a region that is of interests to countries near and far.  India has had a long 
history with countries in Latin America.  In 1959 India was one of the first governments 
to recognize Fidel Castro’s new regime in Cuba, and even opened an embassy in the 
country in 1960.166  In November 1997, India’s Commerce Ministry launched the 
program “Focus: LAC” which focuses on the potential market in Latin America.167  
Recently, the newly elected Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, visited Brazil for 
the sixth annual BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit on July 
15 – 16, 2014.  The summit was held in South America as part of the BRICS outreach to 
the region, and meeting with heads of state was key to the new Prime Minister in order to 
“open new windows of engagement and opportunities between Asia’s third largest 
economy and a resource-rich vibrant region that is rapidly emerging as an economic 
dynamo and a growth pole in the world.”168  
Since the 1990s India’s bilateral trade with Latin America has gone from some 
couple hundred million dollars to $42 billion in 2013.169  India’s top recipient of exports 
is Brazil, which is shortly followed by Mexico, Colombia, and Peru.  Ten percent of 
India’s energy imports come from Brazil, and in 2010 India increased its Argentinian 
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soybean import from $606 million to $1.8 billion making its total Argentinian imports 
$2.5 billion.170  Venezuela is currently India’s largest trade partner in the region with 
trade reaching $14 billion for 2012 – 2013; Mexico, Argentina, Peru and Colombia 
follow.171  “Since 2000, Indian companies have invested about $12 billion in the region in 
information technology (IT), pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals, mining, energy, and 
manufacturing.”172  In Argentina there are seventeen different Indian companies.  One 
Indian IT company, TCS, is one the largest employers in Uruguay employing over 900 
citizens, and established a Global Delivery Center that put Uruguay on the global IT map. 
Similarly, TCS and Evalueserve, another Indian IT company, employ more than 2,000 
Chileans. 
Connections between Latin America and India run deeper than just economics, 
the famous Chilean poet Pablo Neruda was influenced by verses from the Bengalese poet 
Rabindranath Tagore.173  Mexican writer Octavio Paz even published a memoir, 
Vislumbres de la India, where he wrote about his admiration for the Indian culture and 
his time in New Delhi as a diplomat and later ambassador.  Through basic observations of 
both the Hispanic culture and Indian culture, the author believes there are much more 
similarities between the two cultures than most tend to think.  Both Indians and Hispanics 
give great importance and value to family, with several grandparents, cousins, uncles, 
aunts, etc. living closely and visiting often.  Both cultures dress with vibrant garments, 
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eat colorful foods, dazzle festive decorations, and have large crowd celebrations.  With 
crowded streets and stray dogs, often cities in Latin America resemble cities in India 
mostly due to their large European colonial influences.174  Both India and the countries of 
Latin America have some of the world’s largest inequalities and challenges.175  Due to 
these similarities, this chapter discusses the rise of terrorism in Latin America and how 
similar counterterrorism strategies used in India should be considered for Latin America.
The Rise of Terrorism in the Western Hemisphere
According to the United States Department of State the lack of progress in Latin 
America’s counterterrorism capabilities is due to “corruption, weak government 
institutions, insufficient interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and a 
lack of resources.”176  Unlike more the familiar transnational terrorist groups in the 
Middle East and those discussed in the second chapter on India, transnational criminal 
organizations pose a more significant threat to the region.  There have been efforts to 
investigate the possible connections of these criminals to terrorist organizations.  The 
Department of State’s investigation found that there are no active cells of al Qaeda or 
Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere, but that there are ideological sympathizers in 
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South America and the Caribbean that continue “to provide financial and ideological 
support to those and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.”177  
Latin America does have a growing presence of Islam.  An article by M. David 
Sills, a professor of Christian Missions and Cultural Anthropology at the Southern 
Baptist Theological Seminary, and Kevin Bagget, a candidate for a Doctorate in 
Missiology at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, looked at the history of the 
spread of Islam and how it came to Latin America.  The authors present three waves of 
Muslim immigration to Latin America beginning in the sixteenth century with Spanish 
and Portuguese armies who were required to claim Catholicism as their religion, but 
secretly remained devout Muslims.178  The second wave came with the African slaves to 
the New World with heavy influences in Haiti and Brazil.  The third wave began around 
1830 with indentured servants from Asia and eventually Syrian and Lebanese immigrants 
came to the region from 1880 to 1955.  These immigrants settled in Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile.  According to the authors, today, large populations of Muslims are arriving to 
Latin America from West Africa.  Although the author of this thesis strongly believes 
that not all Muslims are terrorists, it is important to note that the presence of Islam in 
Latin America when discussing the rise of terrorism in the region. 
United States policy makers have shown concerns over the increasing influence of 
Iran in Latin America.  Especially since both Iran and Hezbollah are reportedly linked to 
two separate bombings against Jewish targets in Buenos Aires; the Israeli Embassy in 
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1992 and the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) on July 18, 1994.179  Iran 
has been trying to work with governments of the region to bypass current U.S. and U.N. 
sanctions.  More specifically under the leadership of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
Iran forged a strong relationship with the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez; a 
relationship this paper will later discuss in greater depth. Since the end of Ahmadinejad’s 
leadership and the death of Chavez, it is believed that the relationship between the two 
countries has dissolved.  As for Hezbollah one critic, Steven Dudley, believes that “it’s 
business.”180  In a speech before the Organization of the American States (OAS) Inter-
American Committee Against Terrorism in February 2014, Dudley relayed what some 
view as Hezbollah’s regional involvement in Latin America as simply a means to raise 
money and not to influence their ideological agenda.
On the contrary, some critics believe that Iran and Hezbollah do pose threats in 
the Western Hemisphere and point to their role the Argentinian bombings as an example.  
In 2011, the United States unraveled a plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in 
Washington, D.C.181  The plot involved Iran allegedly recruiting an agent who it thought 
was a member of a Mexican drug trafficking organization, but actually a Drug 
Enforcement Administration confidential source.  Similarly, these critics also point to 
Hezbollah’s involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering, and the 
organization’s connection to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People’s 
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Army (FARC), a violent Colombian terrorist group.  In May 2013 Alberto Nisman, the 
lead prosecutor investigating the 1994 bombing against AMIA, released a report that 
claimed that the AMIA attacks were not an isolated incident, but rather part of a regional 
strategy involving Iran’s establishment of intelligence stations throughout Latin America 
in order to carry out attacks in coordination with Hezbollah.182  Nisman believes that the 
1994 attacks could be linked to a case of two Guyanese men convicted in 2010 for 
conspiring to attack New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport since one of the 
men reportedly confessed to spying for the Iranian Ambassador in Venezuela.183  Nisman 
also suggests that Iran could still be developing terrorist plots in Latin America within 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Paraguay, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Uruguay. Unfortunately, he does not provide any evidence to any terrorist plots or of 
Iranian sleeper cells in the region. 
The relationship between Iran and countries in Latin America was strongest under 
the leaderships of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad.  Chavez played a key role in Iran’s expansion into the region by assisting 
the country in forging relationships with the Presidents of Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua.184  A Congressional Research Service report found that “while Iran has 
promised assistance and investment to these countries, observers maintain that there is 
little evidence that such promises have been fulfilled.”  During his presidency 
Ahmadinejad visited the region eight times and the countries included Venezuela, 
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Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Cuba.  According to Stephen Johnson, the 
Director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
and Afshin Molavi, a Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, 
Ahmadinejad’s trips to the region were not successful and were more of an attempt to 
appease domestic concerns about Iran’s political isolation. Molavi even stated, “it makes 
them [Iranians] feel good to have allies in America’s backyard.”185  Also during 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency Iran opened six embassies in Latin America in addition to the 
existing embassies in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela.186  These new 
embassies were located in Colombia, Nicaragua, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Bolivia.  
In a 2012 hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services former SOUTHCOM 
Commander Douglas Fraser reported that Iran has 36 Shi’a cultural centers in 17 
countries throughout Latin America on top of a Spanish-language satellite television 
network in order to counter the ideologies of the West.187  Former Commander Fraser has 
also stated that there is no known increase of Iran’s military presence in the region and 
that it’s relationships are purely “diplomatic and commercial.” 
Iran has strong ties to the Lebanese terrorist group, Hezbollah, which has 
conducted several fundraising activities in the Tri-Border area of Latin America. The 
map below shows the border region between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, which is 
considered a “regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and human trafficking; counterfeiting; 
pirated goods; and money laundering – all potential funding sources for terrorist 
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organizations.”188  According to the State Department’s report Argentina and Brazil have 
maintained substantial capabilities to combat terrorism in the Tri-Border area, on the 
other hand Paraguay has faced some challenges. 
Map 3.
*NOTE: Lebanonwire189
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One of the most powerful organized criminal networks in the Tri-Border Area is 
known as the Barakat network, primarily operated by Assad Ahmad Barakat.190  In 2004 
Juan Zarate, the Treasury Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Executive 
Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes stated, “we are designating a key 
terrorist financier in South America who has used every financial crime in the book, 
including his businesses, to generate funding for Hezbollah," following the designation of 
Assad Ahmad Barakat as an Islamic extremist in Paraguay.191  Later in 2006, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury designated nine individuals and two entities from the Tri-
Border area that had provided financial and logistical assistance to Hezbollah through 
Barakat network.192  According to a 2009 report by the RAND Corporation on organized 
crime and terrorism it is estimated that the Bakarat network has channeled about $20 
million per year through the region to Hezbollah.193  The network’s former headquarters 
in Paraguay was found to also have Hezbollah propaganda in videotapes and CDs with 
suicide bomber materials.  Former Manhattan District Attorney, Robert Morgenthau, 
estimated that between $50 million to $500 million goes to Hamas and Hezbollah from 
the Western Hemisphere.194  Paraguay’s Cuidad del Este is at the center of the largest 
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illicit economy in the Western Hemisphere with an estimated $12 billion a year in illegal 
trade.  Estimates show that Brazil and Argentina have the largest Muslim populations in 
South America with about one million inhabitants each respectively.195  The Tri-Border 
area has about 25,000 Arab residents mostly of Lebanese decent.196
In order to provide perspective into just how dangerous this region could be to the 
national security of the United States, The Fund for Peace, a Washington, D.C. based 
security think-tank, used an example that demonstrated just how these funds are used by 
Hezbollah to support its own counterintelligence capabilities.197  The incident involved 
agents from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) New York Field Office.  The 
agents were assigned to covertly observe Hezbollah operatives in the Tri-Border area, but 
a few minutes after the agents had deplaned they received orders to communicate back 
with the office in New York.  An anonymous fax from the Tri-Border had been sent to 
the New York Field Office with photos of the covert FBI agents.  It is not just Hezbollah 
that has connections to the region, but according to The Fund for Peace other groups in 
the region include, “the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (or the Egyptian al-Jihad), Wahhabi-
aligned Sunni fundamentalists, al-Qaeda (with several informants making trips in the late 
1990s), the Taliban, Egypt’s al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Jihad Organization 
(Hezbollah’s terrorist arm68), Colombia’s FARC, and (in the past) Peru’s Shining Path. 
Moreover, several Russian mafia groups (most saliently the Chechen mafia), the Chinese 
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Triad.”198  This is particularly significant because despite the lack of operational terrorist 
cells in Latin America, the equation for what leads to the sprout of terrorist networks in a 
country and capabilities for one to rise are there.  
Colombia
The year 2013 was particularly successful for Colombia as it pertains to a 
reduction of terrorist activities.  The Colombian military launched a successful campaign 
against the region’s most significant and largest terrorist organization the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).199  Under the leadership of President Juan Manuel 
Santos the Colombian government and the FARC were able to reach partial agreements 
on land reform and political participation, a telling sign of the changes in this internal 
armed conflict that has plague Colombia for nearly half a century.200  President Santos 
has also began engaging the country’s second largest terrorist group, the National 
Liberation Army (ELN).  The group has expressed interest in finding a “political exit” 
and has even released two high-profile kidnapping victims and named a five-person 
negotiating team.201  Formal peace negotiations with ELN have not yet begun, and 
concluding negotiations with the FARC remain uncertain.
The United States Department of State 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism 
maintains that the majority of terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere were 
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committed by the FARC.  The FARC, which was established in the early 1960s was 
declared a foreign terrorist organization by the United States in 1997,202 and is 
responsible for claiming the lives of some 220,000 people.203  The FARC was originally 
created to defend the rights of Colombia’s poorest citizens and has several goals 
including, “overthrow the Colombian government, create a new state founded on 
Marxist-Leninist principles, liberate the country from the ruling-class elites, and defeat 
the lawless national military.”204  In Congressman Brad Sherman’s opening remarks for 
the hearing “Terrorist Groups in Latin America: The Changing Landscape,” the Ranking 
Member highlights that it is believed that in the FARC’s high point, the group had 
approximately 16,000 to 20,000 troops.205  During the same hearing Douglas Farah, 
Senior Associate for the Americas Programs at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, stated that since 1999 the FARC has established a direct relationship with the 
government of Iran.206  Other Latin American countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Panama have also been revealed to be supportive of 
the FARC.  Today the FARC is largely unable to hold territory, which is a drastic 
decrease from the 1990s when the group controlled more than 40 percent of the national 
territory and Colombia is by almost every measure a more safe and stable country.  
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Much of the success of the Colombian government’s battle against the FARC is 
due in large part to continued U.S. assistance.  One example of a successful joint 
endeavor between the two governments is Operation Titan.  Together, United States and 
Colombian investigators “dismantled an international cocaine-smuggling and money-
laundering ring that allegedly used part of its profits to finance Hezbollah.”207  Authorities 
made more than 130 arrests, including the arrest of Chekry Harb in Bogota, a Lebanese 
kingpin who acted as a hub between South American cocaine trafficker and Middle 
Eastern militants.  The two-year operations began as a money-laundering investigation 
but slowly investigators found links between Harb and Hezbollah, nearly 12 percent of 
the group’s profits went straight to Hezbollah. 
During its peak in the 1990s, it almost seemed as though the FARC would 
actually reach the capabilities of defeating the Colombian government.  In 1999, U.S. 
President Bill Clinton launched Plan Colombia, a multi-year, multi-billion dollar program 
with the purpose to tackle drug-related issues in the region.208  With the election of 
President Alvaro Uribe in 2002, the country had a leader willing to fight with all of the 
nation’s resources by seriously strengthening the military.209   In 2002, U.S. President 
George W. Bush authorized the U.S. funds for Plan Colombia to be used directly against 
the FARC.  Previously Plan Colombia funds were strictly used for counterdrug purposes.  
United States assistance to Colombia was at its peak during President Uribe’s 
administration in 2014, $611 million.  Despite Colombia being one of the top recipients 
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of United States aid, the assistance has never accounted for more than 26 percent of 
Colombia’s national security budget.210  In 2004, Colombia was the highest recipient of 
U.S. Foreign Aid in the Western Hemisphere with just Iraq, Israel, Egypt, and 
Afghanistan ahead of it.211  
Map 4. 
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With the increased assistance of the United States, the Colombian government 
attacks against the FARC were not the only factors that helped reduce the influence of the 
organization in the region.213  Lieutenant Colonel Sean McCarthy lists three factors that 
have eroded the ideological commitments of the FARC’s base: 
 The FARC lost several key members of its leadership, and these positions were 
difficult to fill with equally qualified replacements. 
 The quality of recruits noticeably dropped as more under-aged children filled the 
ranks and struggled to cope with the psychological horrors of war. 
 Roughly 90 percent of the FARC’s soldiers were illiterate and possessed little 
primary school education.  Although competent warriors skilled in guerilla tactics, 
many were unable to comprehend the organization’s complex ideological beliefs. 
 The FARC was forced to cut back on most of its regular political meetings due to 
increased operations tempo.  As a result, many new recruits weren’t properly 
indoctrinated into FARC ideology and struggled to grasp the political and social 
needs of the people they were defending. 
This is when President Uribe’s efforts were beginning to be recognized by the citizens of 
Colombia and public opinion of the FARC began to shift negatively. Enter the next stage 
of Colombia’s counterterrorism strategy against the FARC with the election of President 
Juan Manuel Santos.  President Santos, unlike his predecessor, advocated on a peaceful 
platform to resolving the conflict with the FARC.214  Santos believed that President 
Uribe’s strong military approach to the conflict, though successful, was not the answer to 
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permanently end the FARC.  This is where Colombia is today; the government is 
pursuing a comprehensive strategy of negotiations that do not involve armed conflict.
Much like the previous chapter discussed about India’s counterterrorism strategy, 
Colombia’s counterterrorism strategy has also been plagued with accusations of harsh 
human rights violations.  President Uribe was often criticized for spying on journalists 
and political enemies, and even allowing abuses in the military.215  In 2008, a Colombian 
Army Commander resigned after an investigation found military personnel had lured 
impoverished young men from a slum in Bogota, Soacha, to a remote city in the center of 
a warzone and murdered the men to inflate the number of insurgents killed.216  Around 
the same time prosecutors had also been investigating accusations that President Uribe’s 
military had killed over 1,000 civilians outside of combat.  Colombia’s armed forces 
were often promised cash payments and more vacation time if they produced more bodies 
of dead FARC soldiers.217  It is believed that the Colombian military had even gone so far 
as to disguise civilian bodies in guerilla uniforms, weapons, or rebel communications 
equipment.  Justice for the “false positive” scandal has also come slowly.218  A June 2012 
article in the Los Angeles Times reported that in the cases of Colombia’s “false positives 
scheme,” which are being tried in civilian courts rather than military tribunals, verdicts 
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have only been reached for 170 of the 3,350 cases.219  The article reports that according to 
human rights groups, “more than 3,300 mostly poor, unemployed or mentally challenged 
people fell victim to ‘extrajudicial executions’ by Colombia's armed forces from 2002 to 
2008.”220  Vice Magazine reported that in 2007, the worst year for false positives, one in 
every five combat kills was a false positive.221  As of September 2013, only one of the 19 
men that disappeared from Soacha has had their killer convicted, but the conviction was 
appealed and the defendant is now a fugitive. 
Venezuela and Cuba
Cuba was placed on the U.S. State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list 
in 1982 and has remained on that list since.222  Despite the 2013 State Department 
terrorism report states, “there was no indication that the Cuban government provided 
weapons or paramilitary training to terrorist groups,” Cuba remains on the list.  Under the 
leadership of Fidel Castro and now his brother Raul Castro, communist Cuba has had a 
history of supporting revolutionary movements and government throughout Latin 
America and Africa.223  The Cuban government has been known to host members of 
foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives.  U.S. policy towards Cuba over the 
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years has largely consisted of isolating the country through economic sanctions.224  Today 
most of the concern lies in human rights violations committed by the Cuban government.
Venezuela and Cuba consistently make the State Department’s list of countries 
determined to not be cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts.225  As discussed earlier 
in the chapter Venezuela’s late President Hugo Chavez formed a close relationship with 
Iran, and since his death the new leadership under President Nicolas Maduro has 
maintained the economic, financial, and diplomatic cooperation.226  Maduro has also 
publically stated that he plans to continue and strengthen ties with Iran.  Credible reports 
claim that Venezuela has maintained its support of activities that benefit known terrorists, 
including a safe haven for individuals linked the FARC, ELN, and Hezbollah supporters.  
Much like Cuba, Venezuela’s record on human rights has been an issue.  In 2014, a 
student-led protest erupted into violence and 42 people were killed, more than 800 
injured, and over 3,000 people were arrested.  The U.S. has shown great concern over the 
deterioration of democracy and human rights in Venezuela on top of the governments 
lack of cooperation with counterterrorism efforts in the region.227 
Concluding Thoughts
The close proximity of Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States 
home front makes the rise of terrorism in the region an issue of great concern.  Terrorist 
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organizations thrive on corruption, weak government institutions, weak or non-existent 
legislation, and a lack of resources, all of which are present in the region.  Despite 
terrorism not being the focal point of U.S. policy in Latin America, anti-terrorism 
assistance has been increased in the region since the attacks on September 11, 2001.228  
With the expansion of assistance to Colombia, the United States has seen tremendous 
results in their efforts.  Congressman Ted Poe, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, warned that striking any deal is not necessarily a 
good deal.229  FARC senior leaders may benefit from a deal with the Colombian 
government, but the foot soldiers may loose out, which could lead them to break away 
from the FARC and form their own terrorist organizations.  Negotiations between the 
FARC and the Colombian government should be of great concern to the United States; 
this is not the time to pull back.
What Latin America is seeing now according to Celina Realuyo, a professor at the 
National Defense University, “is a disturbing convergence of terrorism and crime from 
the mountains of Afghanistan to the jungles of Latin America that threatens the rule of 
law, governments, the economy, and society.”230  Prior to the attacks by al-Qaeda on 
September 11, 2001, Hezbollah was the terrorist group responsible for the most U.S. 
casualties.  The organizations longstanding reliability on support from overseas groups 
and individuals, specifically in Latin America, could just be the beginning.  While 
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Hezbollah may not be plotting a terrorist attack on the United States, its influence in the 
region could lead deeper anti-American sentiments in the region from non-Muslims. 
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Conclusion
Terrorist groups have been known to target countries with unstable governments, 
weak or failed regimes, and a population desperate for salvation.  Whether it is a 
government that oppresses its people or neglects their basic human needs, we have seen 
terrorist groups infiltrate countries where the government has failed its people.  Countries 
in South America, much like those of the Middle East and Africa, have governments 
plagued with corruption, oppression and neglect.  Terrorist groups throughout South 
America have links to Hezbollah, who before al Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, 2001, 
claimed more American lives than any other terrorist organization.231  Government 
leaders in Latin America have strong relationships with the government of Iran, a 
government that has repeatedly been designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism by the U.S. 
State Department.232  Both Cuba and Venezuela have neglected to cooperate with U.S. 
antiterrorism efforts and have provided safe havens for terrorists.233  Despite the absence 
of operational al Qaeda or Hezbollah terrorist cells in Latin America, the components for 
what attracts them to a region are there. 
Given today’s political climate fiscally constrained policy-makers in the United 
States need to make decisions on U.S. counterterrorism strategy.  The rise of terrorism in 
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Latin America and regime instability throughout the region could draw Muslim extremist 
leaders from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia to introduce their radical ideology 
right in America’s backyard.  This thesis has evaluated one form of counterterrorism 
strategy, foreign aid.  The first chapter looks at foreign assistance programs that protect 
U.S. national interests through militarization, police training, or programs promoting an 
image of positive action, like PEPFAR, that have proven to be successful.  It also looks at 
countries that have received aid, like Afghanistan and Mali, that have not been so 
successful and why.  U.S. foreign assistance needs to be looked at in a case-by-case basis 
depending on the country receiving aid.  Enhancing U.S. power throughout the world can 
also come from improving the United States’ image through assistance programs, and not 
just by having the world’s largest army.  Aid plays an important role in counterterrorism 
efforts by undercutting the ideological fuel that leads to terrorist radicalization and 
recruitment.234  
Foreign aid as a counterterrorism strategy has proven to be an effective 
counterterrorism strategy in India and Colombia.  Chapter 2 looked at India, a country so 
diverse it could be compared to a continent, like South America.  India is the world’s 
largest democracy, but it is a country that has been overwhelmed with tension since its 
partition in 1947.  After exploring terrorist threats in the Jammu and Kashmir region, 
Andhra Pradesh, and the northeastern states of Asham and Nagaland, it was found that 
the role of U.S. foreign assistance to the country has been crucial to its stability but it 
needs to continue.  Cooperation between the United States and India through U.S. foreign 
assistance is vital to maintaining security.  India’s close proximity to countries in the 
234 Ronald Crelinsten, Counterterrorism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009, 199.
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Middle East and its high Muslim population make it more susceptible to terrorist attacks, 
but the Indian government has consistently made its counterterrorism efforts one of the 
country’s top priorities.  
Today the United States is in an engaging in military airstrikes against an al 
Qaeda splinter group and rival for leadership of global jihad known as the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  ISIS is a violent terrorist group that has killed dozens of people 
in its efforts to create an Islamic state across Sunni area of Iraq and Syria.235  This is 
particularly significant because in September 2014, al Qaeda leaders believed to be 
hiding in Pakistan called for the rise of jihad and the return of Islamic rule in India, where 
ISIS has been recruiting several Indian Muslims.  The new al Qaeda offshoot, Qaedat al 
Jihad, is specifically targeting three Indian states, Kashmir, Gujarat, and Assam.236  ISIS 
has already shown to be capable of recruiting fighters from all around the world.  
According to Ajit Singh, senior fellow at South Asia Terrorism Portal in New Delhi, 
radicalized Muslims are more likely to fund ISIS and that is why al Qaeda is trying to 
increase its influence.  With both ISIS and al Qaeda trying to recruit from India’s 13 
percent Muslim population, the role of U.S. assistance to the country is crucial.  
One of the strengths of United States foreign assistance discussed in the second 
chapter is the law enforcement establishment that has been training other countries’ 
police and intelligence forces.  ISIS represents what al Qaeda once was, “the world’s 
largest grouping of jihadists bound by a common faith in a hard-line interpretation of 
235 CNN Library, “ISIS Fast Facts,” CNN Online, November 6, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/. 
236 Madison Park, “Al Qaeda says it’s opening new branch in India,” CNN Online, September 4, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/04/world/asia/al-qaeda-india/. 
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Islam.”237  India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) alleges that more than 300 Indian 
youths have been recruited to fight for ISIS, and has highlighted the states of 
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh as possible areas 
where radicalization could take place.238  The U.S. and India need to establish a small and 
sustained program for India that would train Indian police (state and federal) both in the 
U.S. and in India.239  U.S. assistance to India is currently on a decline because relations 
with the country are shifting from a “donor-recipient” to a “strategic partnership” 
relationship.240  The U.S. pivot to Asia during President Obama’s first term left many 
Indians complaining that the United States focused too much on China and Pakistan by 
pursuing economic and counterterrorism links to each country respectively and ignoring 
India.241  It is important to U.S. – India relations that the Obama Administration makes 
India relations a greater priority especially with the recent election of a new government 
in New Delhi.  United States collaboration with India could be key to the fight against 
ISIS and al Qaeda, as well as assist in maintaining stability in the Indian homeland.  
Celina B. Realuyo, a professor at the National Defense University, described the 
changing landscape of South America at a February 2014 hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.  Realuyo stated, “Terrorists 
have political objectives while criminals seek to maximize profits. What we are 
237 Sudanand Dhume, “The ISIS Siren Call to India’s Muslims,” The Wall Street Journal Online, 
September 4, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-isis-siren-call-to-indias-muslims-1409845828. 
238 Kabir Taneja, “India’s Blind Spot on ISIS,” The Diplomat, September 21, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/indias-blind-spot-on-isis/. 
239 Paul Staniland, “Improving India’s Counterterrorism Policy after Mumbai,” Combating Terrorism 
Center Sentinel 2, issue 4 (2009), https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/improving-india’s-counterterrorism-
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240 “US aid to India drops by 16%,” The Times of India, April 15, 2013, 
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witnessing today is a disturbing convergence of terrorism and crime…”242  The United 
States has provided foreign assistance to countries of Latin America for years.  With its 
close proximity to the U.S. homeland regional stability is of high priority to 
policymakers.  The U.S. role in Colombia’s counterterrorism strategy against the FARC 
was key to its success.  Today, the violent terrorist group is hardly capable of holding 
territory, a far cry from controlling nearly 40 percent of Colombia’s national territory 
during its peak in the 1990s.  The Tri-Border area is known as one of the most unstable 
areas in Latin America, the border region between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, is 
considered a “regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and human trafficking; counterfeiting; 
pirated goods; and money laundering – all potential funding sources for terrorist 
organizations.”243  Much like India, the U.S. needs to continue to provide assistance to 
countries in Latin America.  
Currently, the Colombian government is in the midst of negotiations with the 
FARC.  The U.S. needs to play a larger role in these negotiations to assure that any 
agreement reached benefits both the high level leaders of the FARC, as well as, the foot 
soldiers in order to prevent smaller factions from forming.  With ISIS we have seen what 
offsets of terrorist groups are capable of doing, preventing the same from happening in 
Colombia with the FARC should be of high priority to the United States and its interests 
in the region.  In chapter two, recommendations for increased U.S. assistance to India in 
the form of training local and federal police were discussed.  The same should apply for 
242 Celina B. Realuyo, “Terrorist Groups in Latin America: The Changing Landscape,” Opening Remarks, 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Hearing on February 4, 2014, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington: 2014.
243 “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013,” United States Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism, 
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U.S. assistance to Latin American countries.  The U.S. has assisted with counternarcotic 
police training for Latin American countries in the past, but counterterrorism police 
training methods need to be included.  Now is not the time for the United States to reduce 
its foreign assistance to the region.  Foreign assistance methods provided in this thesis 
have proven to be successful when administered consistently and in collaboration with 
the receiving government.  A combination of economic and bilateral development 
assistance in Latin America can change the minds of terrorist sympathizers in the region 
and provide preventative measures against the rise of terrorism. 
India has seen its share of terrorist attacks where as, countries in Latin America 
have just had a glimpse when in comparison.  Much like in India, the U.S. should assist 
countries of Latin America to strengthen their intelligence apparatuses.  Counterterrorism 
strategy is not perfect, as we saw in chapter 1; it needs to be implemented in a case-by-
case basis. India and countries of Latin America would benefit greatly from preventative 
measures like increasing police capabilities in counterterrorism tactics.  The United States 
is consistently the world’s leader for contributions to humanitarian and development 
assistance, and the U.S. law enforcement agency is one of the most effective in the world. 
This type of assistance in the Tri-Border Area would be extremely valuable.  
Humanitarian assistance throughout Latin America could also prove to be helpful in 
reducing any rise of anti-American sentiments and deter individuals from assisting 
groups that are tied to terrorist organizations.  The goal of U.S. foreign assistance is to 
expand opportunities that promote U.S. interests in countries around the world, and build 
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